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We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a cer-
tain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different
definitions of domination and of the number of different payoff values. Ad-
ditionally, the consequence of restriction to constant-sum games is shown.
1 Introduction
If I have good reasons not to use a certain option in a strategic situation, or can safely
assume that my opponent will not use some of his options, then the situation can be
considered as equivalent to a simpler one, in which the respective options are not avail-
able. Through the elimination of some of this options, however, it could become possible
to discard further options.
The procedure described above serves as a generic template for several solution con-
cepts in game theory, which will now be presented in more detail. In general, we consider
two player games in normal form, that is given by a pair (A,B) of n×m payoff matrices.
For a fixed pair of matrices, we define several relations between subgames, that is pairs
(I, J) with I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. They differ by the justification needed to
delete a certain strategy from the game.
Definition 1.1 (Strict Dominance). The notion of strict dominance is defined through:
1. (I, J)→<< (I \ {i}, J), if there is an i0 ∈ I with Ai0,j > Ai,j for all j ∈ J .
2. (I, J)→<< (I, J \ {j}), if there is a j0 ∈ J with Bi,j0 > Bi,j for all i ∈ I.
3. ⇒<< denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of →<<.
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Definition 1.2 (Dominance1). The notion of dominance is defined through:
1. (I, J) →< (I \ {i}, J), if there is an i0 ∈ I with Ai0,j ≥ Ai,j for all j ∈ J , and a
j0 ∈ J with Ai0,j0 > Ai,j0 .
2. (I, J) →< (I, J \ {j}), if there is a j0 ∈ J with Bi,j0 ≥ Bi,j for all i ∈ I, and an
i0 ∈ I with Bi0,j0 > Bi0,j.
3. ⇒< denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of →<.
Definition 1.3 (Weak Dominance2). The notion of weak dominance is defined through:
1. (I, J)→≤ (I \ {i}, J), if there is an i0 ∈ I with Ai0,j ≥ Ai,j for all j ∈ J .
2. (I, J)→≤ (I, J \ {j}), if there is a j0 ∈ J with Bi,j0 ≥ Bi,j for all i ∈ I.
3. ⇒≤ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of →≤.
If, for some mode of domination, we have (I, J)→ (I \ {i}, J) witnessed by i0, we say
that i is (weakly / strictly) dominated by i0. Provided that we actually move to the
subgame (I \ {i}, J), we say that i is eliminated by i0. An analogous convention is used
for column-player’s strategies.
Once a game and a mode of elimination have been specified, the goal is to find a
minimal subgame, that is a subgame not further reducible. For all three notions, Nash
equilibria of the subgame are also Nash equilibria of the original game, so iterated
strategy elimination can be regarded as a pre-processing step in the computation of
Nash equilibria. For iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies the converse is
also true: Strategies used in Nash equilibria are never eliminated.
It is known that there is a unique minimal element for strict dominance (⇒<<) for each
game with finite strategy sets, while this is not true for dominance or weak dominance3.
For weak dominance, uniqueness up to equivalence can be recovered for zero-sum games,
or more generally, for games with jointly varying payoffs, as shown in [7]. A game has
jointly varying payoffs, if Aij = Akl ↔ Bij = Bkl.
Instead of eliminating just one dominated strategy at each step, it is possible to
eliminate all currently dominated strategies at once4. As argued in [6], this notion can
be axiomatically justified, and it yields a unique minimal result:
Definition 1.4 (Simultaneous Dominance).
(I, J)→s< (I \K,J \ L), if
1The notion called dominance here, following [7], is called weak dominance in some parts of the litera-
ture.
2The notion called weak dominance here, following [7], is called very weak dominance in some parts of
the literature.
3The claim of order invariance up to strategy permutation for weak dominance given in [8, Proposition
1] is wrong.
4Doing so for strictly dominated strategies does not influence the final result, while doing so for weakly
dominated strategies could result in empty strategy sets.
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1. There are ik ∈ I, jk ∈ J for each k ∈ K with Aik ,j ≥ Ak,j for all j ∈ J and
Aik ,jk > Ak,jk .
2. There are il ∈ I, jl ∈ J for each l ∈ L with Bi,jl ≥ Bi,l for all i ∈ I and Bil,jl > Bil,l.
3. K ⊆ I and L ⊆ J are maximal among all subsets fulfilling 1. and 2.
The transitive and reflexive closure of →s< will be denoted by ⇒s<.
Another notion we will consider is the elimination of never best responses (against
pure strategies). This concept belongs to the realm of rationalizability conditions as
considered in general in [1]. The probably best known definitions of rationalizability
are the definitions of [10] and [2]. Here a strategy will be eliminated, if it is not a best
response to any of the remaining strategies for the opponent. As shown in [1], there is
a unique maximal reduced subgame, provided that one starts with finite strategy sets.
Definition 1.5 (Elimination of never best responses). The notion of iterated elimination
of never best responses against pure strategies is defined through:
1. (I, J)→br (I \ {i}, J), if for each j ∈ J there is an ij ∈ I with Aij ,j > Ai,j .
2. (I, J)→br (I, J \ {j}), if for each i ∈ I there is a ji ∈ J with Bi,ji > Bi,j.
3. ⇒br denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of →br.
2 The Computational Problems
There are several possible ways to obtain computational problems from the notions of
iterated elimination of strategies, a variety of them for strict dominance, dominance and
weak dominance have been studied in [5], showing all of them to be NP -complete for
dominance and weak dominance, and most of them to be in P for strict dominance.
Here we will study problems similar to those considered in [8] or [4], asking whether it
is possible to eliminate a certain strategy.
Definition 2.1. Strict has an n ×m game A, B and a strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ n as input,
and answers yes, if there are I, J with ({1, . . . , n}, {1, . . . .m})⇒<< (I, J) and i /∈ I.
Definition 2.2. Dominance has an n × m game A, B and a strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ n as
input, and answers yes, if there are I, J with ({1, . . . , n}, {1, . . . .m}) ⇒< (I, J) and
i /∈ I.
Definition 2.3. Weak has an n ×m game A, B and a strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ n as input,
and answers yes, if there are I, J with ({1, . . . , n}, {1, . . . .m})⇒≤ (I, J) and i /∈ I.
Definition 2.4. Simultaneous has an n × m game A, B and a strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ n
as input, and answers yes, if there are I, J with ({1, . . . , n}, {1, . . . .m})⇒s< (I, J) and
i /∈ I.
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Definition 2.5. Response has an n×m game A, B and a strategy 1 ≤ i ≤ n as input,
and answers yes, if there are I, J with ({1, . . . , n}, {1, . . . .m})⇒br (I, J) and i /∈ I.
There are several interesting modifications to the problems introduced above, focusing
on additional properties of the game. For Elimination ∈ {Strict,Dominance,Weak,
Simultaneous,Response}, we use k-Elimination to denote the restriction of the re-
spective problem to games with at most k different payoff values, that is |{Aij | i ≤ n, j ≤
m}∪ {Bij | i ≤ n, j ≤ m}| ≤ k. Z-Elimination refers to the restriction to zero-sum (or
constant sum5) games. k-Z-Elimination is defined in the straight forward way.
3 Previous and new Results
In each step of any elimination process at least one strategy has to be eliminated, oth-
erwise the elimination stops. Thus, any elimination process is of polynomial length, and
can be guessed and verified in polynomial time. Therefore, all problems introduced above
are trivially decidable in NP . For the notions with unique minimal result, membership
in P follows with the same reasoning.
NP -completeness for 2-Dominance was established in [4], which of course implies
NP -completeness for k-Dominance (k > 2) and for Dominance. In [8], P -hardness6
is shown for 6-Z-Weak. That Z-Dominance can be solved in P was independently
shown in [3].
In the present paper, we show that k-Strict is P -complete for k ≥ 3, and k-Z-Strict
is P -complete for k ≥ 4. Both 2-Strict and 3-Z-Strict are NL-complete. In a zero-
sum game with payoffs in {0, 1}, only trivial cases of strict dominance are possible, and
there cannot be any iteration of elimination. This allows to decide 2-Z-Strict in L.
By proving them to be equivalent to 2-Strict, also Response and k-Response
(k ≥ 2) will be shown to be NL-complete.
We establish (again) polynomial time decidability of Z-Dominance. For 3-Z-Dominance
as well as for 3-Z-Simultaneous we show P -completeness, leaving the case k = 2 open.
Without the restriction to zero-sum games, we can show that 2-Simultaneous is P -
complete.
For weak dominance, we establish the membership in P of Z-Weak, and reduce the
number of payoff values needed for P -completeness, so that we can prove 3-Z-Weak
to be P -complete. The problem 3-Weak is NP -complete. For the case of just two
different payoff values, we only establish P -hardness of 2-Weak, and leave the remaining
questions open.
5It is straight-forward that these cases are equivalent. Technically, our examples will be constant-sum
games rather than zero-sum games.
6While P -completeness is claimed, the corresponding part of the proof is wrong. However, as we will
show later, the P -completeness result is true.
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4 Complexity classes and there complete problems
In this section, we shall briefly introduce the complexity classes occurring in our results,
and present their complete problems we use to derive the completeness-results. Most of
this section is based on [9].
The class NP captures the problems decidable by a polynomially time-bounded non-
deterministic Turing machine. NP -complete problems are not assumed to admit fast
decision algorithms. A prototypic NP -complete problem is 3SAT, defined as following:
Definition 4.1 (3-Satisfiability). 3SAT has a list of clauses as input, each containing
three literals of the formXi or ¬Xi. The question is whether truth values can be attached
to the literals, so that at least one literal per clause is true.
A polynomially time-bounded deterministic Turing machine decides the problems in
P . The concept of P -completeness captures the problems where a substantial speed-
up through parallel computing is least to be expected, i.e. the inherently sequential
problems. As a prototypic P -complete problem we use several versions of the monotone
circuit value problem (MCV):
Definition 4.2 (monotone circuit value problem). The problemMCV takes a monotone
circuit as input, that is a directed acyclic graph (Dag), where the vertices are labeled
with And, Or and False. Vertices labeled with False always have in-degree 0, while
And and Or vertices have in-degree less or equal 2. The value of a False vertex is
false. An And vertex has the value true, if and only if all his input vertices have value
true7; an Or vertex has value true, if and only if he has an input vertex with value true.
There is exactly one vertex with out-degree 0, the root. The answer to the problem is
yes, if and only if the root is assigned the value true.
There are two different sets of additional restrictions imposed on the circuits we will
use, both lead to problems equivalent to the original MCV:
Definition 4.3. In the problem MCV1, And and Or vertices are alternating. Each
False vertex is input to a specific Or vertex; And vertices only have Or vertices as
input (if any). All Or vertices have in-degree 2. Two vertices never share all their inputs
(except when the set is empty). The root is labelled And. There is at least one vertex
with each label.
Definition 4.4. In the problem MCV2, And and Or vertices are alternating. Or
vertices only have And vertices as input. All Or vertices have in-degree 2. Each And-
vertex has at most one False-vertex as input. The root is labelled And, and has no
False-vertex as input. Different And-vertices have disjoint inputs, different Or-vertices
have unequal inputs.
7In particular, an And vertex with in-degree 0 always has the value true; thus, we do not need to
include designated True vertices. In theory, the same is true for False and Or vertices, however,
including False vertices explicitly facilitates our constructions.
5
The third complexity class needed is NL, the class of problems decidable on a log-
arithmically space-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine. The standard complete
problem for NL is Reachability, defined as:
Definition 4.5 (Reachability). The problem Reachability takes a Dag G together
with two vertices s, t as input, and answers Yes, if there is a path in G from s to t.
For our purposes, another problem is more useful:
Definition 4.6 (Cycle Reachability). The problemCycleReach takes a directed graph
G and a vertex s as input, and answers Yes, if G contains a cycle which can be reached
from s.
Theorem 4.7. CycleReach is NL-complete8.
Proof. A non-deterministic algorithm for CycleReach storing only a constant number
of vertices works as follows. Guess a node u ∈ V which is kept for the rest of the
algorithm. Starting with v as the active vertex, always guess a successor of the active
vertex, and let it be the new active vertex. If there is no successor, reject. If the active
vertex equals u for the first time, flip a control bit. If it equals u for the second time,
accept. In addition, the number of steps can be counted, and the computation can be
aborted once its exceeds 2|V |.
To see thatCycleReach is evenNL-complete, we present a reduction fromReachability.
If a path from s to t is sought, an edge from t to s is added. Then a cycle can be reached
from s, iff t was reachable from s in the original graph.
5 Inside NL
Theorem 5.1. 2-Z-Strict is in L.
Proof. The only possible dominations are by a row of 1s against a row of 0s, or by
a column of 0s against a column of 1s. If we assume that the initial game allows to
eliminate a row, there must be a row containing only 1s, which of course is uneliminable.
Thus, there will never be a column containing only 0s, that means there will never be a
domination between columns.
The considerations above show that the following algorithm is sufficient to solve
2-Z-Strict. In the first step, determine whether the game has a row containing only
1s, or a column containing only 0s, or neither. In the first case, the initial game is copied
to the output tape row-wise, leaving out all 0-rows, in the second case, it is copied
column-wise, leaving out all 1-columns. In the third case, the complete game forms the
output.
Theorem 5.2. 2-Strict is NL-complete.
8I would like to thank Anuj Dawar and Yuguo He for pointing out this result to me.
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Proof. We show that 2-Strict and CycleReach are equivalent.
Given a game, we can check in logarithmic space whether there are strategies for both
row and column player always granting a payoff of 1 to the respective player after the
first round of elimination. If not, the iteration stops and the answer can be determined
already. If there are such strategies, we consider the remaining strategies of both players
as vertices in a graph. There is an edge from si to tj, iff Aij = 1, and an edge from tj
to si iff Bij = 1. There are no edges between si and sk or between tj and tl. Iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies now corresponds to iteratively removing
vertices without outgoing edges. In the end, only those vertices remain from which a
cycle can be reached.
For the other direction, we start with transforming the graph into a bipartite graph
by inserting a new vertex for each edge. Then we construct a game, where both player
have a special strategy always yielding payoff 1, and a strategy for each vertex in their
set of vertices. An edge corresponds to payoff 1, no edge to payoff 0. Again, removal of
dominated strategies corresponds to removal of vertices without outgoing edges.
Theorem 5.3. 3-Z-Strict is NL-complete.
Proof. We start with presenting a reduction from CycleReach to the problem at hand.
We can assume the graph to be bipartite without influencing the complexity of the
problem. In addition, we can assume that the graph does not contain a cycle of length
2, either by inserting additional edges, or by testing in logarithmic space. The game to
be constructed has fixed strategies s and t for row or column players respectively, and
additional strategies su and tv for nodes u ∈ V1 or v ∈ V2, if {V1, V2} is the partition of
the vertex set. The payoffs for row player are as follows:
t tv
s 1 2
su 0


2 (u, v) ∈ E
0 (v, u) ∈ E
1 otherwise
A strategy tv gets eliminated by t iff v has no successors in the graph, the same holds
for su. As s and t are never eliminated, there cannot be eliminations of tv1 by tv2 or of
su1 by su2 .
Now we have to show that iterated elimination can be executed in NL under the
current restrictions. As all instances where there is a row consisting only of 2s or a
column consisting only of 0s are trivial, we note the following properties for games
containing neither:
1. A row can be dominated only if it contains a 0.
2. A row can dominate another row only if it does not contain a 0.
3. A row cannot be dominated if it contains a 2.
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4. A column can be dominated only if it contains a 2.
5. A column can dominate another row only if it does not contain a 2.
6. A column cannot be dominated if it contains a 0.
Combining these observations, an elimination never changes whether a row contains 0s
or not, or whether a column contains 2s or not. Thus, each row (column) is potentially
dominating, that is contains only 1s and 2s (1s and 0s) or not. We use RD (CD) to denote
the set of potentially dominating rows. If some column c returns 0 or 1 against any row
in RD, then c cannot be eliminated, since no column can return strictly less against
the same row, and the row is uneliminable. By the same argument, each potentially
eliminable row must return 0 against any column from CD, the corresponding sets shall
be called RE and CE .
The sets RE and CE are now used as vertices in a graph: There is an edge from v ∈ RE
to u ∈ CE, if v against u yields 2 and an edge from u ∈ CE to v ∈ RE, if u against v
returns 0. If a vertex has a successor in this graph, it cannot currently be eliminated.
However, the converse is not necessarily true.
Therefore, we have to test for each v ∈ RE whether there is a vˆ ∈ RD, so that vˆ yields
strictly more than v against all u /∈ CE . If there is no such strategy, we add a cycle and
an edge from v to the cycle to our graph. The same procedure is executed for columns.
The existence of successors still implies non-eliminability.
If a row-vertex v has no successor, then there is a row vˆ ∈ RD yielding better rewards
against all u /∈ CE . By definition, vˆ yields 2 against all u ∈ CE, while v yields less.
Thus, vˆ strictly dominates v, and v can be eliminated. The same holds for columns,
showing that we have presented a reduction to CycleReach.
Theorem 5.4. k-Response is NL-complete for k ≥ 2. Response is NL-complete.
Proof. Considering the trivial reducibilities between the concerned problems, it is suf-
ficient to show that 2-Reponse is NL-hard and that Response is in NL. For the
former, note that the reduction from CycleReach to 2-Strict presented in the proof
of Theorem 5.2 also is a reduction from CycleReach to 2-Response.
To show membership in NL for Response, we present a reduction to 2-Strict.
Given the payoff matrix A for row-player, we construct a new matrix Aˆ, where Aˆij = 1,
iff Aij ≥ Aik for all k. For column player, the best payoffs in each row are replaced
by 1, all other values by 0. In the resulting game, the best-response-relationships are
unchanged. By adding a new strategy always returning 1 for each player, the best-
response-relations of the previously present strategies are still unchanged. Never-best-
responses are strategies always yielding 0, and these strategies will be dominated by the
all 1-strategy.
6 P -completeness
We start with presenting polynomial time algorithms for the problems admitting one
(regardless of the number of different payoff values), and then show hardness for the
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lowest k-value possible. Note that the following algorithm can be executed in polynomial
time: Search for a (weakly / strictly) dominated strategy. If there is one, eliminate it
and start again. If there is none, check whether the specified strategy is still there or not.
Provided that the order of elimination is irrelevant, this algorithm solves the problems
at hand. This directly leads to:
Theorem 6.1. Strict is in P .
Theorem 6.2. Simultaneous is in P .
Proof. Only switch from elimination of rows to elimination of columns and vice versa if
necessary.
The remaining cases require more work. Basically, we will show in both cases that a
certain order of elimination is sufficient to eliminate everything that could be eliminated.
Theorem 6.3. Z-Weak is in P .
Proof. When the naive approach finds a way to eliminate the strategy s, then it will
yield the right answer. The only problem occurs if the initial game (A,B) is reduced
to a game (Aˆ, Bˆ), so that s is iteratively eliminable in (A,B), but not in (Aˆ, Bˆ). So
we assume that there is a sequence of eliminations (xi, yi), so that in the ith step the
strategy xi weakly dominates yi, and by that eliminating the latter; the sequence shall
end with yimax = s. The case we have to consider is another possible elimination (x, y),
that makes one of the eliminations in our sequence impossible. We denote the first
elimination being made impossible by (xk, yk).
The only way that (xk, yk) is made impossible is by elimination of xk, so we know
y = xk. If x 6= yk, then (xk, yk) could simply be replaced by (x, yk)
9. Thus, only the
situation xk = y, yk = x is problematic. In this case, however, xk and yk have to be
identical once the kth stage has been reached. Thus, elimination of yk alone does not
enable new weak dominations in later stages. Therefore, the only problematic case is
yk = s. Clearly, this can be avoided if we never use s as a weakly dominating strategy
for eliminations.
The question that remains it whether it might be necessary to eliminate a strategy by
s to allow later elimination of s. This means the following situation:
u v . . .
s a b . . .
r c d . . .
t e f . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1. s weakly dominates r: a ≥ c, b ≥ d
2. u does not weakly dominate v, but will do so once r has been eliminated: a ≤ b,
c > d, e ≤ f
9Or, if x is subsequently eliminated by another strategy z, by (z, yk), and so on.
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3. t does not weakly dominate s, but will do so once v has been eliminated: e ≥ a,
f < b
4. t does not weakly dominate r: e < c ∨ f < d
We have f ≥ e ≥ a ≥ c > d, rendering both f < d and e < c impossible. Thus, t could
be used to eliminate r in such a situation. For more steps between the elimination of r
and the elimination of s, the same considerations apply; showing that elimination by s
is never necessary to allow elimination of s.
Therefore, the following modification of the algorithm above solves Z-Strict: Search
for a strategy weakly dominated by another strategy not equal to the specified strategy. If
there is one, eliminate it and start again. If there is none, check whether the specified
strategy is still there or not.
Theorem 6.4. Z-Dominance is in P .
Proof. We assume that (xk, yk) is a sequence of eliminations, stating that yk is eliminated
in the kth step, which is justified by domination by xk, so that in the last step s is
eliminated. Let (x, y) be another elimination, whose execution leads to (xl, yl) being the
first elimination in the sequence that is impossible. In the case y = xl, we can simply
replace (xl, yl) by (x, yl) without substantial changes. The other case of (x, y) making
(xl, yl) impossible is y being the only strategy against which xl yields better reward than
yl. But then only dominations including y are affected by (xl, yl). If there were an k > l
with yk = y, this does not matter, since y is already gone. In the case xk = y, the
elimination (x, yk) can be used instead. Therefore, the impossibility of executing (xl, yl)
has no substantial impact on later eliminations. The only problematic case is yl = s.
As every column strategy could potentially be the strategy providing strictly better
payoff in the domination of s, the following algorithm is able to solve Z-Dominance:
Pick a column strategy x. Search for eliminable strategies unequal to x, remove them if
found. If there are none left, check whether s has been eliminated. If s is still present,
choose another column strategy for x and repeat. If all columns have been tried without
s being eliminated, s is uneliminable.
Theorem 6.5. 3-Z-Weak, 3-Z-Dominance and 3-Z-Simultaneous are P -hard.
Proof. The claims will be proven using a reduction fromMCV1. From such a circuit, we
will construct a zero-sum game. Row-player has a strategy s∧n for each And vertex with
number n, a strategy s⊥m for each False vertex m and another strategy sB . Column-
player has the strategies t∧i, t∨j and t⊥k for And vertices ∧i, Or vertices ∨j and False
vertices ⊥k.
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t∧i t⊥k t∨j
sB 0 0 0
s∧n
{
−1 if i = n
0 otherwise
0


1 if ∨j is an input for ∧n
−1 if ∧n is an input for ∨j
0 otherwise
s⊥m 1
{
−1 if k = m
1 otherwise
{
−1 if ⊥m is an input for ∨j
0 otherwise
The payoffs of the row-player are given by the table above, the column-player just tries
to minimize the payoffs. The elimination of a strategy s∧n (and t∧n) or t∨j corresponds
to assigning the value true to the corresponding vertices n or j. We will now study
which strategies can be removed under which conditions, and see that the strategies sB,
s⊥m and t⊥k could only be eliminated, if all strategies s∧n have been eliminated first, in
which case the answer is already determined anyway.
sB The strategy sB can be weakly dominated by a strategy s∧n only if t∧n has been
eliminated. In this case, s∧n was eliminated first. sB can be weakly dominated by
a strategy s⊥m only if t⊥m was eliminated first.
s∧n The strategy s∧n is weakly dominated by sB, if all strategies t∨j where ∨j is an
input to ∧n have been eliminated. Provided that t∧n has not been eliminated yet
(the contrary would be impossible), in this case s∧n is also dominated by sB. s∧n
cannot be weakly dominated by a strategy s∧n′ , as long as t∧n′ is still present, and
it cannot be weakly dominated by a strategy s⊥m, as long as t⊥m is still present.
s⊥m The strategy s⊥m cannot be weakly dominated by s∧n, as long as t∧n is still present.
It cannot weakly dominated by sB, as long as a strategy t∧i is present. Weak
domination by a strategy s⊥m′ is impossible as long as t⊥m′ is present.
t∧i The strategy t∧i cannot be weakly dominated by another strategy t∧i′ or by a strategy
t⊥k, as long as s∧i is present. If s∧i is eliminated, t∧i is weakly dominated by any
t⊥k. t∧i cannot be weakly dominated by a strategy t∨j, as long as there is a strategy
s∧n, such that the vertex ∨j is an input to ∧n. The existence of such a vertex can
be assumed, since the root is labelled And, and cannot be eliminated unless all
inputs are eliminated first, this cannot happen.
t⊥k The strategy t⊥k cannot be eliminated by a strategy t∧i or t⊥k′, as long as s⊥k is
still present. Weak dominance by t∨j would only be possible, if no s∧n with ∨j
being an input to ∧n would exists, as explained above, this does not happen.
t∨j The strategy t∨j is dominated by t∧i or t⊥k, if ∧i or ⊥k are the only remaining input
to ∨j , which requires the second input to be true. t∨j could only be eliminated by
t∨j′ , if ∨j and ∨j′ had the same inputs, which was ruled out in our convention, or
if t∨j could also have been eliminated by certain t∧i or t⊥k.
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Theorem 6.6. 3-Strict is P -hard.
Proof. Again a reduction from MCV1 is given. The players have the same strategies as
in the proof of Theorem 6.5, except for sB, which is no longer needed. The payoffs are
given by the following tables, with row-players payoffs first:
t∧i t⊥k t∨j
s∧n 0 0
{
1 if ∨j is an input for ∧n
0 otherwise
s⊥m 1 1 1
t∧i t⊥k t∨j
s∧n
{
1 if i = n
0 otherwise
0
{
0 if ∧n is an input for ∨j
−1 otherwise
s⊥m 0
{
1 if k = m
0 otherwise
{
0 if ⊥m is an input for ∨j
−1 otherwise
It is trivial to see that s⊥m can never be eliminated, and that a strategy s∧n is strictly
dominated by any strategy s⊥m, as soon as all strategies t∨j corresponding to its input
vertices have been removed. Thus, the removal of row-players strategies corresponds
exactly to the corresponding vertices being assigned the value true.
For column player, a strategy t∧i can never be strictly dominated as long as any
strategy s∧n is still present. As the strategy s⊥m will never be eliminated, elimination
of t⊥m is also impossible. The strategy t∨j can be eliminated by any strategy, if there
are no strategies s∧n or s⊥m corresponding to input vertices left, but it can also be
eliminated by the strategy t∧i or t⊥k, where ∧i or ⊥k is the only remaining strategy
corresponding to an input vertex of ∨j for which s∧i or s⊥k is still present. Thus, for
t∨j to be removed, at least one of its input vertices needs to be removed earlier.
Theorem 6.7. 4-Z-Strict is P -hard.
Proof. Once more a reduction from MCV1 is used; in addition to the conditions listed
there, we assume that there are at least 2 Or vertices. Row-player has a fixed strategy
sB, a strategy s∧i for each And-vertex ∧i and a strategy s∨n for each Or-vertex ∨n.
Column-player has strategies t∨j, t∨j−1 and t∨j−2 for each Or-vertex ∨j, where t∨j−x
is only present iff the xth input to ∨j is an And-vertex. The payoffs are given by the
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following table:
t∨j t∨j−x
sB 3 2
s∧i
{
3 if ∨j is an input for ∧i
1 otherwise


1 if ∧ii is the xth input to ∨j
1 if ∨j is an input to ∧i
0 otherwise
s∨n
{
2 n = j
3 otherwise
{
1 n = j
2 otherwise
The only strategies that are potentially eliminable are s∧i and t∨j , corresponding to
the respective vertices being assigned the value true. As explained below, the other
strategies are uneliminable.
sB It is obvious that sB can never be eliminated, since it is a best response against any
of column-player’s strategies.
s∧i If all strategies t∨j where ∨j is an input vertex to ∧i have been eliminated, the
strategy s∧i will also be eliminated. If any of these strategies is still present, s∧i
cannot be removed, since it achieves the maximal payoff against it.
s∨n The strategies s∨n are uneliminable. Due to convention, there is an Or-vertex
∨j with n 6= j. If the vertex ∨j has at least one And-vertex as input, there
is an (uneliminable) strategy t∨j−x against which s∨n yields 2, which cannot be
exceeded. If both inputs of ∨j are False-vertices, t∨j itself is uneliminable, and
takes the place of t∨j−x in the argument above.
t∨j As s∨j cannot be eliminated, a strategy t∨j can only be eliminated by a strategy
t∨j−x. This happens, if and only if the strategy s∧i corresponding to the And-
vertex forming the xth input of ∨j was eliminated previously.
t∨j−x The strategies t∨j−x can never be strictly dominated in a subgame where sB is
still present. Since sB can never be eliminated, the same is true for all strategies
t∨j−x.
Theorem 6.8. 2-Weak, 2-Dominance and 2-Simultaneuous are P -hard.
Proof. This time, we present a reduction from MCV2. The reduction works for all three
problems simultaneously, as they yield identical answers for the constructed game.
Row player has a strategy s∧i for each And vertex ∧i, and a strategy sB. Column
player has a strategy t∨j for each Or vertex ∨j, and strategies t∧⊥k, where k simultane-
ously enumerates And and False vertices. The And-vertex k is referring to is ∧k, the
corresponding False-vertex is ⊥k. We require ⊥k to be an input of ∧k, thus, if the root
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is ∧r, ⊥r does not exist. The payoffs are given by the following tables, starting with row
player:
t∨j t∧⊥k
s∧i
{
1 if ∨j is input to ∧i
0 else
{
1 if ⊥k is input to ∧i
0 else
sB 0
{
1 if ⊥k does not exists
0 else
t∨j t∧⊥k
s∧i
{
1 if ∧i is input to ∨j
0 else
{
1 i = k
0 else
sB 0 1
For the following considerations, we always assume that the strategy corresponding
to the root of the circuit has not been eliminated yet. Otherwise, the answer is already
determined, and further elimination do not matter.
s∧i The strategy s∧i is weakly dominated by a strategy s∧i′ , if and only if the inputs of
∧i are a subset of the inputs of ∧i′ , which can only happen if the input set of s∧i is
empty. If ∧i has a False-vertex as input, this is ⊥i as input. Then s∧i cannot be
eliminated by sB, as long as t∧⊥i is still present. Since t∧⊥i cannot be eliminated
as long as s∧i is present, this renders s∧i uneliminable.
If all existing inputs of ∧i are Or-vertices, then s∧i is weakly dominated by sB,
once all strategies t∨j corresponding to inputs of ∧i have been removed. Since
there is a strategy t∧⊥k, where ⊥k does not exist, in the case of weak dominance,
we also have dominance. Thus, elimination of s∧i corresponds to the vertex ∧i
being assigned the value true.
sB By convention, for the strategy t∧⊥r corresponding to the root, ⊥r does not exist.
As we assume this strategy not to be elimianted yet, and sB is the only strategy
achieving payoff 1 against it (since a non-existing vertex cannot be the input to
another vertex). Thus, sB is uneliminable.
t∨j Due to our convention, each vertex ∨j has exactly two And-vertices as input. If
the strategy s∧i corresponding to one of them is eliminated, then also the strategy
t∨j is eliminated, e.g. by t∧⊥k, where ∧k is a remaining input, or by any other
strategy, if there is no remaining input. Due to the strategy sB , weak dominance
will already imply dominance.
If both of the strategies s∧i, s∧i′ corresponding to inputs of ∨j remain, then t∨j
cannot be eliminated. Thus, elimination of t∧j corresponds to assigning the value
true to the vertex ∧j.
t∧⊥k As long as sB is not eliminated, a strategy t∧⊥k can never be eliminated by a
strategy t∨j. The strategy t∧⊥k might be eliminated by another strategy t∧⊥k′ ,
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only once s∧k is eliminated first. In this case, the strategy t∧⊥k has no further
relevance anyway.
7 NP -completeness
Theorem 7.1. 3-Weak is NP -complete.
Proof. A reduction from 3SAT shall be presented. We assume that for different clauses
c and c′, the set of literals occurring in c is never a subset of the set of literals occurring
in c′. For a clause c, ci refers to the ith literal in c.
Row-player has a strategy s, as well as strategies sd for each clause d and sl+ and sl−
for each variable l. Column-player has a strategies tc, t
i
c for each clause c and i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
as well as a strategy tk for each variable k. The first matrix contains the payoffs for the
row-player, the second one column-player’s payoffs.
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t1c t
2
c t
3
c tc tk
s 0 0 0 2 0
sd
{
1 c = d
0 else
{
1 c = d
0 else
{
1 c = d
0 else
{
1 c = d
0 else
0
sl+ 0 0 0 0
{
1 l = k
0 else
sl− 0 0 0 0
{
1 l = k
0 else
t1c t
2
c t
3
c tc tk
s 0 0 0 0 1
sd
{
2 c = d
0 else
{
2 c = d
0 else
{
2 c = d
0 else
{
1 c = d
0 else
0
sl+
{
1 c2 = l ∨ c3 = l
0 else
{
1 c1 = l ∨ c3 = l
0 else
{
1 c1 = l ∨ c2 = l
0 else
{
1 l ∈ c
0 else
{
1 l = k
0 else
sl−
{
1 c2 = ¬l ∨ c3 = ¬l
0 else
{
1 c1 = ¬l ∨ c3 = ¬l
0 else
{
1 c1 = ¬l ∨ c2 = ¬l
0 else
{
1 ¬l ∈ c
0 else
{
1 l = k
0 else
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We claim that the strategy s is eventually eliminable, if and only if there is a satisfying
truth assignment of the original formula. For the first direction, assume that a satisfying
truth assignment is given. For each variable l, the strategies sl+ and sl− weakly dominate
each other. Thus, we can eliminate sl+, if the variable l is assigned the value true, and
sl− otherwise.
In the next step we will eliminate all strategies td. For each clause d, one of its literals
must be true. Assume that the ith literal for some given clause d is true. We claim that
td is now weakly dominated by t
i
d. t
i
d obviously provides better or equal payoff against
s, all strategies sc and all strategies sl+ where the literal l does not occur in d, as well as
all strategies sl− where the literal ¬l does not occur in d. If the literal l (¬l) does occur
in d, but not on the ith position, both tid and td give payoff 1 against sl+ (against sl−).
If the literal l (¬l) occurs on the ith position in d, then, by assumption, l is true (false),
thus, the problematic strategy sl+ (sl−) has been removed in the first step. Thus, we
have covered all cases, and shown that td is indeed always eliminable, provided that
there is a satisfying truth assignment for the formula.
Once all strategies td are removed, the strategy s is weakly dominated by every re-
maining strategy, thus, it can be removed.
For the other direction, we have to show that if s can be removed, there has to be a
satisfying truth assignment for the formula. We will assume that the elimination process
was stopped immediately after the removal of s.
In the first step, we will show that for each variable l, only one of the strategies sl+
and sl− was eliminated. For that, we observe that as long as tl is present, the two
strategies are the only ones weakly dominating the other one, thus, only one of them
can be removed prior to the removal of tl. Now as long as s is present, a strategy tl
might only be weakly dominated by a strategy tk. However, as either sl+ or sl− is still
present at this point, tk does not weakly dominate tl for l 6= k. Whether sl+ or sl−
was eliminated determines the truth value assigned to the variable l. If neither was
eliminated, the truth value can be chosen arbitrarily.
As s is the only strategy providing row-player with a payoff of 2 against any strategy
td, all the strategies td were eliminated prior to s. We claim that td must have been
weakly dominated by some strategy tid. This is obviously true, provided that sd was
not removed previously. Now sd can only be weakly dominated, if all strategies t
j
d
for
j ∈ {1, 2, 3} are removed first, which in turn would require removal of sd, showing that
sd will not be eliminated at all. Therefore, there must be an i, such that td was weakly
dominated by tid. Assume that the ith literal in d was l (¬l). Then t
i
d gives less payoff
to column-player against sl+ (against sl−) then td, thus, sl+ (sl−) was removed first.
According to the construction of our truth assignment, this means that the ith literal
occurring in d is true, so the clause d is also true. As these consideration applied to all
clauses, the truth assignment constructed satisfies the formula.
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8 Conclusions
If one is willing to accept the whole of P as efficiently computable, our results show that
both iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies as well as iterated simultaneous
elimination of dominated strategies are valid as efficient solution concepts for arbitrary
games, while neither iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies nor iterated
elimination of dominated strategies can be regarded as such. For zero-sum games, how-
ever, all considered concepts can be applied in polynomial time, allowing no distinction
on the basis of computational efficiency.
Things change drastically if efficient execution on a parallel machine is required: Sud-
denly, we can only apply iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and only
in the case of two different payoffs, or of three different payoffs in a zero-sum game.
This might seem a devastating result, suitable as motivation for either abandoning the
request for efficient execution on parallel machines, or the concept of iterated elimination
of (weakly / strictly) dominated strategies altogether.
Instead, we suggest a new version of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. Before the elimination process is started, all payoffs are compared to some bench-
mark value: Low values are replaced by 0, high values by 1. This can be done in NL
easily, even for a wide variety of procedures to determine the benchmark value. For ex-
ample, the median payoff level could be used. Then, fast elimination becomes possible.
It might even be speculated that such a concept is closer to actual human thinking than
the original version.
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